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Abstract—Following previous agent-based research on peer
review, this paper presents a game theory-inspired model that
looks  at  peer  review  as  a  cooperation  dilemma.  We  tested
different scientist behaviours and network topologies in order
to understand their implications on the quality, efficiency and
type of resource distribution in the science system. We tested
random,  scale-free  and  small  world  networks  connecting
scientists and three types of referee behaviour: self-interested
(providing  unreliable  opinion),  normative  referees  (providing
reliable opinion) and conformist reviewers (conforming to other
referees’  behaviour).  Preliminary  results  indicate  that
differences  in  the  combination  of  referee  behaviour  have
significant impact on the quality of  the process  and that  the
percentage  of  conformists  is  one  of  the  most  crucial  model
parameters.
I. INTRODUCTION
EER  review is  recently under  the  spotlight.  Cases  of
misconduct [1], [2], proofs of biased referee behaviour
[3] and studies about the process quality and scientists’ satis-
faction [4] called for reconsideration of the quality and sus-
tainability of this important institution, especially in periods
of explosion of online journals and publications.
P
Previous examples of applications of agent-based models
have testified  to  the advantages  of  looking at  the internal
mechanisms of peer review, e.g.,  scientist behaviour at the
micro level [5], [6].
This paper proposes a game theory-inspired approach that
looks at peer review as a cooperation problem with network
externalities, with room for strategic and normative behav-
iour and reciprocal influence by all scientists involved.
This approach brings a theoretical basis to previous work
and a more realistic modelling, in which the efforts and the
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resources are limited, and so the strategic behaviours make
more sense.
II. THE PEER REVIEW GAME
We assumed that peer review was a cooperation dilemma
where players can take on two different roles, authors and
referees.  Following [5], each player  i   ∈ {1,…,n} had a cer-
tain amount of resources Ri that could be seen as productiv-
ity, available time, funds, human resources, etc. according to
academic status, position, experience, and scientific achieve-
ment.
They could choose how much to invest in writing articles
and reviewing. We assumed that this investment had a cost
c>0 independently of the player’s role, given that both activi-
ties (writing and reviewing) have a cost on resources.
In  case  of  publication,  authors  received  a  benefit  b>c,
since publishing usually leads to achieve resources in a sci-
entist’s career (such as getting grants, funding for attending
conferences, developing projects, hiring researchers, etc.).
On the other hand, reviewers do not receive any benefit,
since we understand that the reviewing activity does not pro-
duce any profit in terms of consumable resources.
The game assumed continuous investment choices, mim-
icking successive rounds of the publication process.
We defined esi, eri  [0, 1] as∈  the efforts made for submit-
ting  and reviewing respectively. Then, we assumed that the
cost of both submitting and reviewing articles was propor-
tional to these efforts. In the simplest form, we had  csi=esic
and crj=erjc.
The author’s submission quality was given by 
Qsi=esiRi (1)
while the quality of the review performed by a reviewer   j∈ {1,…,n} | j ≠ i was:
Qrj=erjRj (2)
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We  assumed  the  peer  review  game  had  a  certain
publication threshold (T).
A  review  was  considered  fair,  i.e.,  reflecting  the  true
value of the paper, if Qrj ≥ T.
If the review was fair, a given submission was accepted if
Qsi ≥  T and the published  author received  the publication
benefit. Otherwise, if the submission was rejected, the author
got  nothing.  Note  that  the  condition  Qsi ≥  T meant  that
authors  with  higher  resources  could  meet  the  publication
threshold more easily (i.e., with lower effort).
If  the  review was  unfair,  the  paper  was  accepted  with
probability 0.5, which meant that the expected utility of the
submission was ½b.
In  each period, costs were  subtracted and benefits were
added to the authors’ and referees’ own resources, which lead
to the period payoff table shown in Table 1.
The equilibrium of the game was as follows: referees had
a dominant strategy of putting a zero effort (erj = 0) in their
review. Knowing this, the best response for authors was to
set  esi = 0 in turn,  leading to a unique equilibrium of the
game where only low quality were produced and publication
was at random.
III. THE AGENT-BASED MODEL
We built an agent-based model that implemented the peer
review game by adding behavioural  heterogeneity.  We as-
sumed one type of agent, namely scientists.
In each time step, agents played twice, once as author and
once  as  referee.  The  role  order  was  random and  couples
changed with roles, meaning that the same two agents were
unlikely to play together twice in the same time step.
A fixed global resource  R was divided among scientists
following an individual resource share that varied at the be-
ginning of each time step. Thus, the resource available for
each scientist i was Ri.
The benefit received in case of publication was given by
b, where b was a parameter of the model.
The basic cost  of  both producing a  submission and re-
viewing was the parameter c, which was multiplied by the ef-
fort.
The effort for reviewing articles depended on three types
of  referee  behaviour,  i.e.,  self-interest,  normativism  and
conformism:
• Self-interested  referees  did  not  contribute  to  the
quality of peer review by putting little effort in re-
viewing (erj = 0.5), trying to save resources for pub-
lishing.
• Normative referees were intrinsically motivated by
Mertonian norms of scientist conduct [7], e.g., they
always put a great  effort in reviewing in order to
provide  pertinent  judgment  so  intentionally  con-
tributing to the quality of peer review (erj = 0.75).
• Conformists  were  referees  whose effort  depended
on the behaviour of other scientists which they were
connected with.  While self-interested and altruists
were not influenced by others’ behaviour, conform-
ists were sensitive to social  influence.  They com-
miserated their effort by looking at the average ef-
fort by their connected scientists.
We manipulated the initial combination of self-interested,
normative and conformists in order to understand interaction
effects among these types of behaviour.  As it  is known in
behavioural game theory, the combination of heterogeneous
behaviour over time can have dramatic implications for the
aggregate level of cooperation [8]. 
Furthermore, we assumed that scientists were connected
in networks, which defined the neighbourhoods affecting the
behaviour  of  conformists.  We  tested  different  network
topologies,  by initializing the  system with  random, small-
world  and  scale-free  networks  [9].  These  topologies  have
been tested by previous studies to reproduce co-authorship
networks of scientists.
IV. RESULTS
Preliminary results by implementing the proposed model
in NetLogo indicated that different behavioural combinations
could dramatically affect the quality of peer review.
While  the  percentage  of  self-interested  referees  in  the
population could condition cooperative equilibria, we found
that also the presence of a significant number of conformists
could  have  negative  effects.  This  is  especially  evident  in
conjunction with the presence of a minimal number of self-
interested and small world network topologies.
V. FUTURE WORK
This model represents a first step in an ongoing research
on peer review processes under the scope of the New Fron-
tiers of Peer Review (PEERE) COST action.
It is known that reputation is crucial in science dynamics,
although it is not implemented in the presented model. Fur-
ther steps are the inclusion of reputation mechanisms that re-
flect better the real scientific world in the long term, in order
TABLE I.
PEER REVIEW GAME FOR AUTHOR I SUBMITTING A PAPER HAVING J AS REFEREE
Referee
Qrj ≥ T Qrj < T
Author
Qsi ≥ T b – csi, – crj ½b – csi, – crj
Qsi < T – csi, – crj ½b – csi, – crj
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to study the effects on the system, and the validation of the
model against real-world data and other game-theory models
[10].
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